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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE C. BLONQUIST, et al,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
VS

*
'
TROY BLONQUIST, et al,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
13160

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE OF
T H E CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiffs-respondents,
George G. Blonquist, L a rry Don Wright, Keith Blonquist and their wives against defendants-appellants,
Troy Blonquist, Grace Blonquist, Justine Blonquist
and Kenneth Blonquist to have a road passing over these
parties' property declared a public road by dedication
and to recover damages for the obstruction of said road.
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DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The lower court found that the road in question,
the South Fork of Chalk Creek Road, from its junction
with State Route 133 up to the Newton-Oswald Gate,
was dedicated to public use and a public thoroughfare
and awarded the plaintiffs $500 in general damages.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask that the decision of the lower court
be reversed, that the part of the South Fork of Chalk
Creek Road in dispute be declared a private road from
the Blonquist Gate up to the Newton-Oswald Gate,
and that respondents not be entitled to any damages
but be required to bear the costs of this litigation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The South Fork of Chalk Creek Road is a road
which from its junction with State Route 133 passes
over the land of the parties to this litigation. An early
survey of this land area made by the Bureau of Land
Management indicates that a road existed from the
junction with Route 133 to a short distance from the
Blonquist Gate. However, the disputed part of Chalk
Creek Road was not on the plat at this time. (Abstract
33) From the time that this land was patented the
ownership of the land over which the road passes was
2
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for the most part in the Blonquist family. Testimony
at trial indicated that the county had helped maintain
the road for some years. However, testimony also revealed that the road had been repaired and maintained
over the years by private landowners, appellants in
particular. (Abstract 15, 16, 37-43, 50, 51) Various
gates have been placed across the road as it passes over
the parties' properties up to other privately owned land.
One of the first gates encountered by a traveler is the
Blonquist Gate placed across the road to control livestock and travel over a half century ago. (Abstract 47)
After the Blonquist Gate, the next gate is the NewtonOswald Gate. The road between the Blonquist Gate
and the Newton-Oswald Gate is part of Chalk Creek
Road in dispute. Testimony at trial showed that a
"private property-no trespassing sign" had been placed
on the Blonquist Gate for over forty years and that
the gate at various times was locked. (Abstract 7,
37, 48)
The South Fork of Chalk Creek Road has no
importance as an access to government or publicly
owned land. (Abstract 53, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61) The
land abutting the road besides being privately owned
has little use for anything other than limited farming
and grazing. (Abstract 62, 63) Thus, the road is used
primarily by the area landowners as an access to their
property. (Abstract 22, 30-32, 46, 59) Other people
have used the road with the permission implied or express of the Blonquists. For a number of years the road
was used as an access to an airplane beacon, and for
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such use the Blonquists were paid a rental fee. (Abstract
18, 19) The road was used with the permission of the
Blonquists to haul timber at one time. (Abstract 8,
9, 14) Area landowners or lessors, again with the implied or express consent of the Blonquists, have used
the road to drive cattle or sheep. (Abstract 5, 21-28,
46) Testimony indicated that some fishermen with
permission to fish on the private lands in the area, were
permitted to use the road at times. (Abstract 10, 23)
More frequent use ofthe road was made by hunters
who paid the Blonquists a fee to pass through the
Blonquist Gate or who, belonging to the Echo-Chalk
Creek Range Owners Protective Association, upon
purchasing a permit were allowed to use the road.
(Abstract 7, 16, 17, 44, 45, 60)
The present litigation developed as a result of the
appellants' desire to maintain control of the access to
the South Fork of the Chalk Creek Road beyond the
Blonquist Gate. Over the years there have been arguments as to whether or not this part of the road was
public. The County, while expending funds on the
road and listing it on their maps as a County road,
admitted that the designation of the road as a County
road was not done by any legal process (Abstract 2-5)
Area landowners had in the past questioned the road's
status as a County or public road. (Abstract 29) And,
County funds had been spent on this road as well as
other roads in the area not as County roads but as
private roads to accommodate the area landowners.
(Abstract 13, 14, 34, 35)
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Q. But you did authorize funds to be spent on
that road?
A. Yes, that's right. But not as a County road.
Q. Not as a County road?
A. Not as a County raod. We have spent money
on other roads, too, private roads. (Abstract
34, 35)
Another source of contention between the parties
resulted from Summit County tearing down the Blonquist Gate and placing a cattle guard across the road.
To try and limit the injuries to their livestock as a result
of getting caught in the cattle guard, the appellants
started construction of a fence. Posts were placed
along the road as it approached the cattle guard to
help channel the livestock and prevent crowding. These
posts never obstructed the road as shown in plaintiff's
exhibit number Twenty-one. However, due to complaints from the respondents the fence construction
was halted and never completed. At trial respondents
alleged damages to their property as a result of these
fence posts. I t was alleged that the posts made it more
difficult for them to back out of their driveway and
that the posts hindered efforts to plow snow off the
road. Appellants on the other hand claimed damages
against the County as a result of tearing down their
gate and putting in the cattle guard. I t is important
to note that the disputed part ofthe South Fork of
Chalk Creek Road is from 15 to 20 feet in width,
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except for a small section by the removed Blonquist
Gate and present guard, which is 44 feet in width.
POINT I
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D I N G
T H A T T H E D I S P U T E D PORTION OF T H E
SOUTH FORK OF CHALK CREEK ROAD IS
A P U B L I C R I G H T OF W A Y AND ROAD.
The lower court found that the Chalk Creek Road
extending from State Route 133 to the Newton-Oswald
gate, a distance of nearly three and one-half miles,
was a public right-of-way. In order for it to be a public
right-of-way, the road could have existed when the land
over which it passes was owned by the United States
government. Then, when such land was acquired by
a private owner from the government, if no objection
was made to the public road, the private owner was
thereafter barred from asserting any damages and the
road was deemed abandoned or dedicated to the public.
Utah Code Ann. # 27-12-92 (1953).
I n case of a failure by such person so acquiring
title to public lands to assert his claim for damage as aforesaid for three monthse from the time
he shall have received a patent to such lands, he
shall thereafter be barred from asserting or recovering any damages by reason of such public
highway, and the same shall remain open. Id.
In the present case, the disputed part of Chalk
Creek Road was not on the maps when the land was
acquired by the private owner from the United States
6
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government. (Abstract 33) Thus, the road did not
become a public right-of-way as a result of Utah
Code Ann. 27-12-92 or the statutes which preceded
it. This means that in order for the road to now be
considered a public right-of-way it must have either
been acquired by the government under the Eminent
Domain authority, Utah Code Ann. # 78-34-1 et seq.
(1953) or it must have at one time been a private road
which was then dedicated and abandoned to the public
under Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89 (1953). Since there
has been no exercise of the Eminent Domain authority
the lower court concluded that the road was a public
right-of-way as a rseult of Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89
(1953), which reads:
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
Appellants submit that competent evidence has not
been presented to support the conclusion that the disputed portion of Chalk Creek Road was dedicated to
the public.
In order for a dedication to occur, "there must
be a concession intentionally made (by the owner)
which may be proved by declarations or by acts, or
may be inferred from circumstances." Morris v. Blunt,
49 Utah 243, 244, 161 P . 1127, 1130 (1916). Although
no formal ceremony is necessary, there are three decisive requirements which must be proved to show dedication. First, there must be actual public use of the
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highway. Second, the land owner must appear to know
of the use. And third, he must have intended to grant
the right of way to the public. Id. All these requisite
elements were never proven by the respondents. In
fact the evidence presented, according to Utah law,
supports a finding contrary to that of dedication.
The respondents have failed to show that there
was actual use of the highway by the public for the
required ten year period. The standard used to determine ift here was such use is:
"Was there sufficient evidence by competent
testimony to show clear and convincing evidence,
that the public generally, not just a few having
their own special and private interests in the
road, had used the road continuously for ten
years. Peterson v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438
P.2d 545, 546, 547, (1968).
The omission of such evidence by the respondents was
no doubt due to the fact that there was no "public"
use of the highway but only use by those with "special
and private interests" and those who had the permission of the appellants. (Abstract 22-28, 30-32, 45, 46,
59) The reason for which there is a lack of public
interest in using the road is found by examining the
land surrounding the road and to which the road leads.
All this abutting land is privately owned. (Abstract
52, 53, 57, 58, 61) Thus, it is not a necessary access to
public lands used for hunting, fishing, picnicing, etc.,
as was the case in Choumos v. Bell, 21 Utah 2d 164,
442 P.2d 926 (1968). In order to practice any recre-
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ation on the land surrounding the Chalk Creek Road,
permission of the land-owners was and is required.
(Abstract 7, 16, 17, 44, 45, 54, 59, 60) Appellants
submit that this distinction should be observed in the
present case as it was in the Chournos case. In Chournos
two roads were claimed to have been dedicated to the
public. The first road was a necessary access to public
lands and was extensively used by hunters and fishermen. The second road, however, was "punctuated only
on occasion by permissive use." The Court held that
the first road was a public right-of-way while the second
road was still a private road. Id. at 166, 928. The
Chournos case illustrates the principle that where there
is no public need to use a road it should not be deemed
dedicated to the public as a result of infrequent permissive use. Appellants submit that the disputed part
of Chalk Creek Road has no value to the public, that
it leads to and is abutted by only private property, and
that the use thereof has been only with the permission
of the landowners for private reasons. And therefore,
just as the second road in the Chournos case, it should
not be deemed dedicated to the public.
Respondents may argue that the road was and is
used by area property owners to get to their land and
therefore has public use. However, the law clearly
states that "such property owners cannot be considered members of the public generally, as that term
generally is used in this area." Peterson v. Combe, supra
at 377, 546.
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Appellants recognize that the road had been used
by government officials to reach an airplane beacon
and that it has been graded in recent years by the
County. (Abstract 18, 19) However, such use was with
the permission of the appellants. Again the Utah
Supreme Court has held that "Such circumstances
hardly . . . show public use." Id. at 380, 548. In
Peterson v. Combe, supra, the road in question had
been graded and maintained by the County. It had
been used by the Weber Basin Water District and by
resolution had been made a county road, it had been
used by the Fish and Game Department, and it had
been used by area landowners. Such use was held
insufficient to show a public use and dedication of the
road. In Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d
426 (1964), the fact that a road had been worked by
the county, claimed by county employees to be a county
road, and indicated on county maps as a county road,
was held to be insufficient to make the road public.
In the present case then, the fact that the County had
done work on the road is not a determination that the
road is a public road as the above mentioned cases
illustrate. In fact, testimony at trial shows that work
was often done by the County on private roads at the
request of landowners. (Abstract 13, 14, 34, 35) The
County itself was undecided as to whether the road
was public or private (Abstract 29) And, with respect
to maintenance of the road, testimony showed that
private efforts had in fact been responsible for much
of the maintenance. (Abstract 15, 16, 37-43, 50, 51)
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Thus, the element of "public use" required before
a finding of dedication can be made is not present in
the case at bar according to Utah law. The use argued
by the respondents falls into the categories of "punctuated permissive use" or use by those having "special
and private interests in the road" and as such does not
meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89
(1953) for dedication.
The presence of the second element necessary to
show a dedication, the awareness of the appellants of the
use of the road, is not contested. However, the presence
of the third and most important element, the intent by
the landowner to grant the highway to the public for
public use, is definitely missing.
The element of intent is the most crucial element
in the finding of a dedication of private property to
public use. The taking of private property "should
not be regarded lightly." Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah
2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 638 (1966).
"The presumption is in favor of the property
owner; and the burden of establishing public use
for the required period of time is on those
claiming it. The mere fact that members of the
public may use a private driveway or alley without interference will not necessarily establish
it was a public way; nor will the fact that it was
shown on the public records to be a public street;
nor even that it had been paved and sign-posted
as a public street by the city." Id. at 143, 648.
"The taking of the property must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence that constitutionally must
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be justified . . ." Peterson v. Combe, supra at 380, 548.
The court in Peterson v. Combe reversed the trial
court's finding of dedication even though recognizing
the rule that on review facts are to be read in the light
most favorable to the arbiter. Id. at 378, 546. The Court
reasoned that when the "favorable review" clashes with
individual property rights such rights cannot be treated
lightly. Id. With this principle in mind, appellants
submit that a review of the facts and the lower court's
decision will show that the lower court erred in finding
a dedication and that no such intent on the part of the
appellants ever existed.
A review of the facts show: that the use of the road
was only with the permission of the appellants; that
such use was infrequent and for private purposes; that
in fact the appellants constructed and maintained for
many years a gate across the road, such gate being torn
down improperly by the county just recently; and,
that such gate was often locked and appellants maintained a ' 'private property - No Trespassing" sign on
the gate for over forty years; and, that there is no intent
of the appellants expressly or implied to dedicate the
road.
This Honorable Court should consider the motives
of the respondents in their attempt to make this road
public. One of the respondents, an area landowner,
desires that the cost for maintaining the road which
gives him access to an infrequently used shed on his
property, be paid by the county, instead of by himself
12
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and the other landowners in interest. (Abstract 21,
30) The respondent County desires that the road be
considered public since they are allocated considerable
funds by the State Road Commission to maintain such
roads. Such funding naturally creates a larger payroll
for County employees and money for County coffers.
Appellants do not wish to condemn the respondents
for pursuing their own interests, but it is submitted
that such self-interest should be recognized. And, that
when weighing the facts and arguments in this case,
the principle of the sanctity of private property should
be observed and the respondents should be strictly
required to meet their burden of proof in establishing
the elements necessary for dedication. Appellants submit that a review of the facts show such burden has
not been met.
And finally, appellants submit that the public need
for declaring the South Fork of Chalk Creek a public
right-of-way be considered. While this consideration
is not expressly mentioned in the dedication statute,
Utah Code Ann. 27-12-89 (1953), it is implied. See
Chournos v. Bell, supra. Presently there is no need
to make Chalk Creek a public road. It is not an access
to public lands nor does it lead to other public roads
which are such an access. (Abstract 52, 53, 57-61)
In fact, the part of the Chalk Creek Road beyond the
Newton-Oswald gate is presently a private road meaning public travel would be halted there if not at the
beginning of the part presently disputed. If in the
13
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future the County foresees a need for a public road
through these private lands such a need can be met
under their Eminent Domain authority. Such a condemnation proceeding would also be more just than
the present efforts to take appellants' property. But,
until such need is shown, appellants submit that the circumstances of this case require that the lower court's
decision be reversed and the South Fork of Chalk Creek
Road from the west boundary of Section 10 to the
Newton-Oswald gate remain a private road.

POINT II
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D W H E N I T INC R E A S E D T H E SIZE O F T H E D I S P U T E D
P A R T OF SOUTH FORK OF CHALK CREEK
R O A D ( I F D E D I C A T E D TO T H E P U B L I C )
TO F O R T Y - F O U R F E E T .
In finding that Chalk Creek Road had become a
public right-of-way from State Route 133 to the Newton-Oswald gate, the lower Court increased the width
of the road over the disputed section from some 15
to 20 feet to forty-four (44) feet. This will necessitate
a widening of the present road and a taking of a
considerable number of acres of appellants' property.
Such a taking of private property was authorized by
the lower court without the exercise of the County's
Eminent Domain authority and just compensation.
Such action is improper because it violates Article One
# 22 of the Utah Constitution which states: "Private
14
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property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation." Appellants submit that if
the disputed part of Chalk Creek Road is held a public
right-of-way by this Court that just compensation
should be paid to the appellants as determined by the
Court or by the County after condemnation proceedings. Appellants also submit that the lower court erred
in arbitrarily setting the width of the disputed part of
Chalk Creek Road at forty-four feet instead of retaining the present width. Appellants will argue this second
point first.
While it is clear according to Utah law that the
width of rights-of-way for public highways is to be
determined by highway authorities, Utah Code Ann.
27-12-93 (1953), such a determination should be
made by "what was reasonable and necessary, under
all the facts and circumstances, for the uses which
were made of the road." Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101
U. 1, 8, 116 P.2d 420, 423 (1941). The use claimed
by the respondents of the disputed portion of Chalk
Creek Road does not demand a wider road than presently exists. Until the respondents can demonstrate
that a wider road is necessary appellants submit that
the road should remain at its present width. See,
Lindsay Land and Live Stock Company v. Chournos,
75 Utah 384, 392, 285 P . 646, 649 (1929). Again, if
in the future some new use is made of the road requiring
a greater width, then the County has its Eminent
Domain authority with which it can appropriately
widen the road.
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Appellants' main contention is that the lower
court has taken private property without providing
the appellants means by which they can be justly compensated. Under such circumstances appellants submit
that they have a right to ask the Court in equity to
grant such compensation.
"We are of opinion that where private property is taken or damaged for public use, as is
alleged in the complaint in the injunction suit,
without any agreement with the owner for compensation, and without any proceedings for
assessment in the manner provided by the statute
relating to eminent domain, a court of equity
may properly take jurisdiction where the only
remedy remaining to the landowner is to present
a claim to the Board of Examiners."
State, by State Road Commission v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, 94
Utah 384, 396 78 P.2d 502, 508 (1937). Such a procedure is the only relief presently available to the
appellants. The appellants are apparently barred from
suing the Road Commission to recover damages under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Springville Banking Company v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 102, 349
P.2d 157, 158 (1960). While certain Utah Supreme
Court decisions have held that Article One Section 22
of the Utah Constitution is self-executing thus constituting authorization by the State to be sued, State
by State Road Commission supra; Kimball v. Salt
Lake County, 32 Utah 253, 260, 90 Pac. 395, 397
(1907); and Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221,
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224, 120 P . 503, 504 (1911), in the recent case of
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354
P.2d 105 (1960), the Court held that "Article I, Sec.
22 of our Constitution is not self-executing, nor does
it give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise .
Id. at 419, 106. The dissent in Springville Banking
Company v. Burton, supra, and an answer to the dissent in the same case have exhausted the major arguments for and against the interpretation that Art. I,
Sec. 22 is self-executing permitting the state to be sued.
However, appellants submit that this Court has recognized that where the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the provisions of Art. I, Sec. 22 are in contention,
that the rights of the citizen must be maintained.
"We think if a case arises where there is no
other method of enforcing a constitutional right
except by suit against the State, then it must
be considered that the State has given its consent to be sued in such a case."
State by State Road Commission, supra at 399, 509.
And further, quoting from a West Virginia case,
"We recognize that the constitutional inhibition against taking private property for a public
use without just compensation is of equal dignity with the inhibition against suing the state.
If necessasy to maintain the rights of a citizen
under the former, the two provisions would be
construed together and the former treated as an
exception to the latter" Id. (emphasis supplied)
While it is stated in the answer to t he dissent in
Springville Banking Company, supra, that this Court
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

has rejected the theory of the implied consent to be
sued when sovereign immunity conflicts with constitutional property rights, Id. at 116, 168, the Utah
Supreme Court actually said in the State by State Road
Commission, supra, case that it was only unnecessary
to permit suit against the state because the "Road
Commissioners could be individually enjoined from
proceeding in any manner forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 399, 509. Thus, the Court up until the
case of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra, had
apparently not rejected the right of a property owner
whose property was taken without compensation to sue
the Road Commission under Art. I, Sec. 22 of the
Utah Constitution. Clearly earlier Utah cases have held
that Art. I Sec. 22 standing by itself gave sufficient
authority for the recovery of damages. Webber v Salt
Lake County, supra, at 224, 504.
In conclusion, prior to the case of Fairclough v.
Salt Lake County, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
held the position that Art. I, Sec. 22 was not a right
given to the citizens which they were powerless to
enforce. Where no other means were available, Art. I,
Sec. 22, provided sufficient authority under which to
sue the State officials or agencies. State, by State Road
Commission, supra, at 399, 509.
Appellants submit that the correct interpretation
of Art. I, Sec. 22, is that enunciated in the case of
State, by State Road Commission, supra, that where
the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar any relief
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to a deserving appellant, Art I, Sec. 22 should be construed as an exception to the sovereign immunity. To
hold otherwise would produce the result that the framers of the Constitution did intend to give the rights
granted in Section 22, and then leave the citizen powerless to enforce such rights. Such an interpretation
would contradict this court's well reasoned case decisions. Id. at 397, 508.
In the event that this Court decides not to modify
the holding in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra,
and permit the appellants to recover damages from
the responsible State officials for the taking of their
property to widen Chalk Creek Road, then appellants
request this Court to exercise its power in equity and
grant a just relief. In such a case appellants submit
that equity should be involved because the actions of
respondents in securing appellants' land was done arbitrarily and unreasonably. Eminent Domain proceedings
should have been brought to acquire the additional land
to widen the road. Thus, under the doctrine stated in
State, by State Road Commission, supra, "that a court
of equity may properly take jurisdiction where the only
remedy remaining to the landowner is to present a
claim to the Board of Examiners," Id. at 396, 508, and
reaffirmed in Springville Banking Company v. Burton,
supra, that " . . . principles of equity no doubt could
be invoked to prevent threatened action of such character . . . " Id. at 103, 158, 159, appellants request
that a just and equitable compensation be determined
to pay them for the land taken to widen the road.
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POINT III
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F I N D I N G
THAT T H E A P P E L L A N T S OBSTRUCTED
T H E ROAD J U S T SOUTH OF T H E K E I T H
BLONQUIST RESIDENCE AND IN GRANTI N G R E S P O N D E N T S $500 D A M A G E S B E CAUSE
THE
OBSTRUCTIONS,
FENCE
P O S T S , W E R E N O T P L A C E D ON T H E R O A D
BUT ALONG I T AND DID NOT OBSTRUCT
A N Y R E A S O N A B L E USE O F T H E ROAD.
After County officials tore down the Blonquist
Gate and replaced it with a cattle guard, the appellants suffered the loss of livestock due to their getting
caught in said cattle guard. To try and remedy this
problem the appellants started construction of a fence
just south of the Keith Blonquist residence to run to
the cattle guard. The purpose of this fence was to
channel livestock approaching the cattle guard and
prevent crowding which was causing the livestock to
get caught in the cattle guard. This road area before
the cattle guard was 44 feet wide, its wideness a result
of its being used as a stopping place for livestock driven
along the road in earlier years. Fence posts were placed
reducing the width of this area from 44 feet to about
30 feet. However, before any wire could be strung or
other connection made between fence posts the appellants were forced to discontinue the fence construction.
The posts were left and remain standing there today.
At trial the respondents conplained that these posts
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caused them to suffer damages in using the road. Specifically it was alleged that the posts caused snow to
build up and out onto the road and made entry and
exit to and from Keith Blonquist's property difficult.
Also it was alleged that the posts hindered county
equipment from properly grading and caring for the
road. The lower court determined that as a result of
the fence posts the respondents suffered damages in
the amount of $500.
Appellants submit that the lower court's determination is in error. Appellants certainly had the right
to place a fence between their property and the road
to try and control livestock and prevent further injuries. While there is legal authority to the effect that
it is unlawful to obstruct highways, Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-12-138 (1963), such prohibition clearly applies to
obstructions on the highway.
. . . but no such vehicles, building material or
other obstructions shall be permitted to remain
on any such highway contrary to instructions
from the board of county commissioners, . . .
Id. (Emphasis supplied)
As appellants' exhibit number Twenty-One shows, the
fence posts erected by them were not on the road but
along it. Further, the width of the road where the fence
posts were placed was still wider than the road before
and beyond this area. Although by erecting the fence
posts entry and exit in and from the Keith Blonquist
may have been less convenient, appellants submit that
it was not made unreasonably difficult. And, while
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after the erection of the fence posts snow may have
drifted out onto the road, this was a problem all up
and down the road and appellants should not be penalized for a common occurrance of nature.
The erection of the fence was the only reasonable
alternative left to the appellants to try and protect
their livestock after the County tore down their gate and
replaced it with a cattle guard. The inconvenience
suffered by the respondents was not a deliberate act
of the appellants, but only a result of their reasonable
effort to protect their livestock.
CONCLUSION
In order for a private road to be dedicated to the
public as a public thoroughfare under Utah Code Ann.
27-12-89 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court has required that there be actual public use of the road, that
the owner must be aware of such use, and that the owner
must have intended to grant the road to the public.
Appellants have shown that there has been no public
use of the road as defined by Utah law. Just as in the
case of Peterson v. Combe, supra, the public use claimed
by the respondents does not meet the standards of
public use required for a dedication. The use of the
road by area landowners is not a public use. The use
of the road by hunters was shown to have been paid
for by them and with the permission of the appellants
and respondents. Also the infrequent use of the road
by fishermen was with the permission of the land22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

owners. Most importantly, the South Fork of Chalk
Creek Road does not lead to public or government
owned land. Thus, as in the Peterson case, there is no
public allure or other reason to open this road up to
the public.
Besides showing that the road has not been used
by the public according to the standards set by law,
the appellants have also shown that while they were
necessarily aware that the road was used by area landowners and sportsmen with their permission, such use
was not permitted with the intention that the road
become a public thoroughfare. Rather, it was a neighborly but restricted accommodation. Most indicative
of appellants' intent to keep the road private is the gate
and "no trespasing-private property" signs erected by
the appellants for the major part of this century.
Appellants also submit that in the event that the
disputed part of Chalk Creek Road is dedicated to the
public, the lower court erred in increasing the width
of the road from some 15-20 feet to 44 feet. First, there
has been no showing that such increase in width is
necessary. The past, present, and expected future use
of the road does not support the increase in width.
Second, if the road width is to be increased, now or in
the future, it should be done under the Eminent Domain
authority of the State. The lower court's action in
widening the road places appellants in the difficult
position of not being able to sue in a court of law to
recover damages or require the County officials to
23
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bring Eminent Domain proceedings according to recent
Utah case holdings. Appellants therefore pray that
this Court in equity grant them reasonable damages
for the taking of their property by the widening of the
road.
Lastly, appellants submit that the awarding of
damages to the respondents by the lower court was in
error. The appellants in starting the construction of
a fence were acting reasonably and responsibly in an
effort to protect their livestock. The inconvenience to
the respondents was forced upon the appellants by the
County's actions in tearing down the Blonquist Gate
and installing a dangerous cattle guard.
Appellants pray that the lower court's decision
be reversed and they be permitted to maintain the road
as a private road or recover a just compensation for
the taking of their property.
Respectfully submitted,
W I L L I A M J . C A Y I A S and
D. E U G E N E LIVINGSTON
Attorneys for Appellants
405 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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